The paradox of openness revisited : collaborative innovation and patenting by UK innovators by Arora, A. et al.
  
 
The paradox of openness revisited : collaborative
innovation and patenting by UK innovators
Citation for published version (APA):
Arora, A., Athreye, S., & Huang, C. (2015). The paradox of openness revisited : collaborative innovation
and patenting by UK innovators. (UNU-MERIT Working Papers; No. 031). Maastricht: UNU-MERIT.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2015
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
  
 
  
 
 
 
#2015-031 
 
The paradox of openness revisited:  
Collaborative innovation and patenting by UK innovators  
Ashish Arora, Suma Athreye and Can Huang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maastricht Economic and social Research institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU‐MERIT) 
email: info@merit.unu.edu | website: http://www.merit.unu.edu 
 
Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) 
email: info‐governance@maastrichtuniversity.nl | website: http://mgsog.merit.unu.edu 
 
Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands 
Tel: (31) (43) 388 4400, Fax: (31) (43) 388 4499 
   
Working Paper Series 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers 
ISSN 1871-9872 
Maastricht Economic and social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology, 
UNU-MERIT 
 
Maastricht Graduate School of Governance  
MGSoG 
 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research 
carried out at UNU-MERIT and MGSoG to stimulate discussion on the issues raised. 
 
 
1 
 
The Paradox of Openness Revisited: 
Collaborative Innovation and Patenting by UK Innovators1 
 
 
 
Ashish Arora  
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC 27708-0120, 
North Carolina, USA & 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Boston, MA. 
Email: ashish.arora@duke.edu 
 
Suma Athreye 
Brunel Business School, Brunel University, UxbridgeUB8 3PH, United Kingdom 
Email: suma.athreye@brunel.ac.uk 
 
Can Huang2  
Institute for Intellectual Property Management, School of Management, Zhejiang University, 
Yuhangtang Road 866, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, 310058, P.R. China 
Email: canhuang@zju.edu.cn 
 
 
 
 
July 2015 
  
                                                            
1 This research was funded by an ESRC grant (ES/K000756/1) with matched funding from the UK IPO. The 
views expressed in this paper represent the views of the authors and not the UK IPO.  The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
2 Please direct all correspondence to Can Huang. 
2 
 
The paradox of openness revisited:  
Collaborative Innovation and Patenting by UK Innovators 
 
Abstract: 
We revisit the "paradox of openness" in the literature which consists of two conflicting views 
on the link between patenting and open innovation—the spillover prevention and the 
organisational openness views. We use the data from the Survey of Innovation and Patent 
Use and the Community Innovation Survey (CIS6) in the UK to assess the empirical support 
for the distinct predictions of these theories. We argue that both patenting and external 
sourcing (openness) are jointly-determined decisions made by firms. Their relationship is 
contingent upon whether the firms are technically superior to their rivals and lead in the 
market or not. Leading firms are more vulnerable to unintended knowledge spillovers during 
collaboration as compared to followers, and consequently, the increase in patenting due to 
openness is higher for leaders than for followers. We develop a simple framework that allows 
us to formally derive the empirical implications of this hypothesis and test it by estimating 
whether the reduced form relationship between patenting and collaboration is stronger for 
leaders than for followers. 
 
JEL Classification: O32, O34 
 
Keywords: open innovation, patent use, patent, external knowledge source, community 
innovation survey 
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1. Introduction: 
Over the last quarter century two apparently contrasting trends have marked the 
innovation process. On the one hand, patents have become increasingly important as an 
appropriation tool (OECD 2004, WIPO 2007). On the other, innovators are increasingly 
relying upon collaboration with other firms and organisations (Chesborough, 2003). The 
question we address in this paper is the relationship between sourcing knowledge from the 
outside to develop innovations and using patents to appropriate the returns from innovation.3 
The relationship between the reliance on external sources and the appropriability 
strategy of firms has been analysed extensively since the early paper by Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002). This literature has converged around two conflicting points of view, which 
Laursen and Salter (2014) dub the “paradox of openness”, namely that opening up to outside 
sources of knowledge to innovate may weaken the firm’s power to capture rents from that 
knowledge. In other words, openness, or external sourcing, entails a trade-off. On the one 
hand, firms are more likely to seek external collaborators if they can protect their innovation 
by patents, and more generally, guard against unintended knowledge spillovers to partners. 
We call this the “spillover prevention” view. The second, which we call “organisational 
openness”, holds that a focus on patenting and exclusivity makes a firm less efficient in 
developing collaborative innovations, and hence also, a less attractive partner. 
Our paper advances the debate on openness versus patenting in several ways. First, 
we argue that the relationship between external sourcing (openness) and patenting is 
contingent. Firms will make different choices depending upon whether they are technically 
superior to their rivals and lead in the market or not. Put differently, the trade-off between 
appropriating benefits and enhancing the efficiency of collaboration differs between leaders 
and followers. Leading firms are more vulnerable to unintended knowledge spillovers during 
collaboration as compared to followers, and consequently, the increase in patenting due to 
openness is higher for leaders than for followers. We test this by estimating whether the 
                                                            
3 There is an older and even more extensive literature on the importance of patents for selling or licensing 
technology (Arrow, 1962; Arora et al., 2001; Gans et al., 2008). See also Arora and Gambardella (2010) for a 
survey of the literature. 
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reduced form relationship between patenting and collaboration is stronger for leaders than for 
followers.  
Second, we advance the literature by treating both patenting and openness as choices 
made by the firm, and therefore, as jointly determined endogenous variables. The existing 
literature has treated either openness as logically prior to appropriability (e.g., Laursen and 
Salter, 2014) or appropriability as logically prior (e.g., Zobel et al. 2013). We develop a 
simple framework that provides a useful way to link the underlying theories based on the 
costs and benefits of collaborative innovation to the observed relationship between patenting 
and openness. Instead of interpreting our results as causal relationships, we treat them as 
describing the patterns of association between patenting and openness, and use our 
framework to infer what these patterns imply for various theories, and how this varies 
between leaders and followers. 
Our third contribution is to introduce new and more precise measures of the use of 
patents based upon a new survey, instead of relying upon perceived importance of various 
appropriability strategies as much of the existing literature has done. Our data are based on a 
survey of more than 800 UK firms using the sixth wave of the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS 6). We are able to augment our data by also using the responses of these firms in the CIS 
6.  
The remainder of this paper is organised in the following way: Section 2 surveys the 
relevant literature on the paradox of openness and highlights the issues that limit the 
empirical analysis in this area. Section 3 articulates why leaders face a different trade-off 
from followers, and provides a simple model of the benefits and costs of openness that links 
the theoretical trade-off to behaviour, which motivates our empirical analysis. Section 4 
introduces the data and describes our key measures. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Openness and Appropriability 
2.1	Theoretical	views		
There are two dominant views on how patenting is related to use of external 
knowledge sources in innovation – we call these the “spillover prevention” theory and the 
“organisational openness” theory.  
In the “spillover prevention” theory (Cassiman and Veuglers, 2002) firms engaged in 
outside collaboration favour the use of patents as a means of reducing spillovers of valuable 
knowledge to external partners. In the simplest version of the spillover theory, firms want to 
prevent imitation of their (focal) innovation and patent in order to protect the rents from that 
innovation. The likelihood of spillovers is greater if the firm is open i.e., if it collaborates 
with a partner, because collaboration inevitably reveals more information to others than if the 
innovation were entirely in-house.  
It is widely recognised that using external knowledge could make it more difficult to 
protect the innovation. For instance, Noordhoff et al. (2011) argue that innovations sourced 
from customers carry the risk that the customer may implement the invention itself, in effect 
becoming a competitor. Giarratana and Mariani (2014) argue that using outside sources of 
knowledge makes it harder to enforce secrecy within the firm, increasing the risk of imitation. 
Consequently, if a firm is unwilling to patent, or if patents are ineffective, it may choose to be 
closed. The key takeaway is that a firm has a greater incentive to patent if it is open than if it 
is closed. Simply put, in this view, we expect to see a positive association between patenting 
and openness. 
Protecting the focal innovation is not the only source of positive association between 
patenting and openness. Many innovations are complex and require prior knowledge or 
background knowledge. Crucial bits of background information can leak out to partners 
during collaboration. Patents can protect against leakage of background material as well. 
Arora and Merges (2004) develop an analytical model in which the fear of knowledge 
spillovers may lead firms to internalise research even if internal research is less productive 
than external research, and the patents condition this trade-off. Using firm-level data from 
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Germany, Buss and Pukert (2015) document a positive link between R&D outsourcing and 
intellectual property infringement, particularly for generic knowledge.  
More broadly, scholars have argued that strong IPRs are often beneficial and 
potentially even necessary for open innovation (Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Chesbrough, 
2003). Thus, Graham and Mowery (2006) suggest that “… IP protection creates a platform 
for the transfer of knowledge assets…” (p.185). Note that Arora and Gambardella (1994) and 
Graham and Mowery (2006) have focused on the importance of IP protection to the agent 
transferring knowledge rather than sourcing it, whereas this paper is focused on firms 
sourcing external knowledge. 
A different source of positive association between patenting and openness is that open 
firms may patent to signal their innovative capabilities to other firms (Alexy et al., 2009; 
Hagedoorn and Ridder, 2012). For instance, Hagedoorn and Ridder (2012) surveyed 86 firms 
which are active in open innovation and found that nearly 90% of the firms regard patent as 
important method for signalling the nature of their technological capabilities.  
In sum, firms that rely on external sources of knowledge (open firms) will patent 
much more than firms that do not (closed firms) for three reasons. First, they want to protect 
their focal innovation produced through collaboration; second, they want to protect the 
background knowledge implicit in the innovation; and third, they want to send out precise 
signals about their value as innovation partners. 
By contrast, the “organisational openness” theory, inspired partly by studies of open-
source software and the literature on “collective invention” (cf. Allen, 1983; Bessen and 
Nuvolari, 2012), implies that firms engaged in external collaboration should be less likely to 
use patents. Laursen and Salter (2014) note that a focus on patenting may make it harder to 
collaborate with outsiders. For instance, Foss et al. (2011) show that in order to benefit from 
customer interactions, firms have to delegate responsibility and increase internal 
communication. An unintended consequence may be that proprietary information can spill 
out. In other words, a focus on protecting the firm’s proprietary information is likely to make 
it more difficult to collaborate with outsiders. Other scholars have also stressed the tension 
between IPR and openness to outside knowledge. Jensen and Webster (2009) contend that 
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knowledge capture practices may impede collaborative knowledge creation process. For 
example, interacting with other organisations to stimulate knowledge creation relies on 
interdependencies and reciprocities, whereas patenting gives rise to exclusivity. The emphasis 
on exclusivity that a patenting intensive appropriation strategy entails can impede the 
efficiency of collaborative development of innovation. 
Interestingly, even those who believe that open innovation is often facilitated by 
strong intellectual property rights (IPR), concede that firms may benefit from voluntarily 
waiving some of their intellectual property rights (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007; Pisano, 
2006). The strategy that firms choose to purposefully disclose selected knowledge to general 
public (including competitors), instead of keeping them proprietary, is termed as “selective 
revealing” (Henkel, 2006; Henkel et al., 2014; Alexy et al., 2013).4 By engaging in selective 
revealing, a focal firm can encourage others to participate in shared problems solving or to 
make complementary investments (Alexy et al., 2013). In other words, patenting and 
associated secrecy can make a firm a less attractive partner to potential collaborators. Thus, 
the organisational openness view would posit that firms that seek external knowledge for 
innovation are less likely to patent because patenting impedes their ability to gain from 
collaboration, and because they want to be attractive partners for potential collaborators.  
To summarise, the literature on openness and appropriability has stressed different 
aspects of the trade-off. The empirical literature has also documented a variety of findings. 
Some studies find a positive relationship between appropriability and openness. For instance, 
Cassiman and Veuglers (2002) use data on Belgian innovators from the European 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) to test how firms fashion their appropriation strategy to 
guard against spillover of knowledge in formal R&D collaborations. They find that the 
reported effectiveness of “strategic appropriation” (secrecy, complexity, lead-time) is 
positively related to the probability of external collaboration, but also that the probability of 
                                                            
4 Practices similar to selective revealing have long existed and can be found in historical accounts. Allen (1983) 
documents how the sharing of information among competitors in the English blast furnaces industry in 1850-
1875 contributed to the innovation and development of the industry. Nuvolari (2004) also studies the collective 
invention settings in the Cornish mining district in the early period of industrialization, which contributed to the 
development of one of the key technologies of that period, steam power. 
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external collaboration is not related to the effectiveness of intellectual-property protection 
(patents, trademarks, and copyrights). Zobel et al. (2013) find that patenting is positively 
associated with different types of external collaborations for a sample of solar technology 
start-ups in the U.S. 
Other scholars report opposite findings. Based on the survey data of 785 Australian 
firms, Jensen and Webster (2009) conclude that the firms favouring internal R&D and relying 
upon secrecy and patenting are less likely exchange of knowledge with partners. When firms 
do use external knowledge, they rely on licensing, hiring other organisations’ workers, and 
public domain sources such as patent disclosures, publications and technical meetings. Firms 
that rely upon external knowledge operate in the opposite manner: They are less likely to use 
patenting and secrecy and collaborate with suppliers, customers, and other partners. Alexy et 
al. (2014) do not report the direct relationship between patenting and openness, but their 
results indicate that patenting intensive firms are less likely to be open, particularly when 
they are underperforming. 
Other studies report intermediate findings. For instance, Arundel (2001) analyses the 
data of the 1993 European Community Innovation Survey for up to 2849 R&D-performing 
firms, and finds only weak evidence that that participation in cooperative R&D increases the 
value of patents over secrecy for product innovations. Laursen and Salter (2014), using data 
on over 2900 innovators from the 4th UK community Innovation Survey, find that openness 
first increases and then decreases with an emphasis on appropriability. Huang et al. (2014) 
use data from a 2003 survey of over 4000 Australian firms. They too find that the degree of 
openness is non-linearly related to appropriability. However, when they restrict attention to 
formal appropriability (patents, copyrights and trademarks), they find a positive relationship 
between appropriability and openness. Arora et al. (2014), using data on nearly 1500 
American manufacturing firms, finds that there is no systematic difference on average 
between firms that used external inventions versus those that used internal inventions. 
However, they also find that firms that relied upon customers and suppliers for inventions 
were less likely to patent the focal invention than firms that relied upon internal invention, 
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whereas firms that used inventions from universities, independent inventors and R&D 
suppliers were more likely to patent the focal invention.  
2.2 Econometric and measurement challenges 
The empirical literature on openness and appropriability suffers from some 
shortcomings. Many studies have tended to use measures of appropriability in general, often 
because specific information on patent use is difficult to obtain.5 Yet, the use of patents is 
fundamentally different from other types of appropriability strategies such as secrecy, first 
mover advantage or product complexity. For instance, collaboration will surely weaken the 
ability of the firm to keep secrets. Indeed, Arundel (2001) reports that openness is associated 
with a greater importance of patenting relative to secrecy. Similarly, knowledge itself is 
“non-rival” in use. Consequently, both partners can use it, reducing the chances of conflict, 
unless one partner wishes to patent it. Thus, Huang et al. (2014) find different results when 
they focus on formal versus informal appropriability. By focusing on a widely studied means 
of appropriability, namely patenting, we hope to sharpen our understanding of this complex 
topic. 
Another shortcoming is the use of the reported effectiveness of patents as perceived 
by the respondent rather than actual use of appropriation methods to protect innovations. 
Perceived effectiveness scores are problematic. Though ordinal, they are typically treated as 
cardinal variables in regressions. Perhaps even more problematic is that they are not easy to 
compare across respondents. Many, but not all, of the studies cited above, including Arundel 
(2001), Cassiman and Veuglers (2002), Laursen and Salter (2014), and Huang et al. (2014), 
use ordinal scaled measures of the importance of appropriability mechanisms, which are then 
aggregated in a variety of ways.  
                                                            
5 For instance, Laursen and Salter (2014) do not distinguish between formal appropriation mechanisms such as 
patents, and appropriation via secrecy or lead-time, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) divide appropriation 
strategy into formal appropriation strategies (which include patents, but also trademarks and copyrights) and 
other types of appropriation strategies. 
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Actual measures of patenting intensity of innovations can overcome this limitation but 
are not commonly used.6 Perez-Luno and Valle-Cabrera (2011), Cohen et al. (2000), Alexy et 
al. (2014) ask innovating firms about their use of patenting in general (specifically, the 
percentage of their innovations for which they had applied for patents), but Arora et al. 
(2014) ask respondents whether they had patented their most significant innovation—the 
innovation that accounted for a plurality of their sales—over the last three years. In our 
empirical analysis, we feature the latter measure, namely whether the firm has patented its 
most significant innovation. We find similar, though weaker, results using the share of 
innovations protected by patents. 
Lastly, the empirical literature has treated the trade-off between appropriability 
(patenting) and openness as a causal relationship (e.g., Cassiman and Veuglers, 2002; 
Laursen and Salter, 2014; Huang et al. 2014; Alexy et al., 2014; Zobel et al., 2013).7 This is 
problematic because both patenting and openness are strategic choices by the firm and it is 
difficult to assign logical priority. Empirically, this requires instruments for the endogenous 
choice, a difficult task which the literature has rarely undertaken successfully. This problem 
can however be sidestepped because theory does not prescribe causality. Instead it prescribes 
patterns of association. An example of such an approach is Buss and Pukert (2015), who 
eschew causal estimation and instead use reduced form estimation to show that R&D 
outsourcing is associated with higher likelihood of product infringement.  
Further, as developed more fully in the next section, the association between openness 
and patent use will differ in strength, and perhaps also in direction, across different types of 
firms. Firms have heterogeneous abilities but there is little attempt in the empirical literature 
to distinguish between the different types of firms—such as firms which are technology 
leaders and those that are technology followers. In other contexts where technological 
                                                            
6 Earlier rounds of CIS typically lacked information on actual use. In some instances, all that was asked was 
whether the firm had patented or not, without normalising by the scale of innovation activity. The latest UK CIS 
does ask for actual share of innovations protected by the different methods of appropriability. 
7 In some cases, scholars (e.g., Huang et al. 2014) have compounded the problem by not distinguishing between 
firms that successfully innovate and those that do not. It is likely that firms that do not innovate are less likely to 
patent and also less likely to report external collaborations.  
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leakages may pose a strategic threat or advantage, scholars have emphasised the different 
costs of collaboration to leaders and followers. For example, writing about agglomeration 
economies, regional spillovers and MNE location, Alcacer and Chung (2014) and Chung and 
Alcacer (2002) find technology leaders care more about accessing scientific resources from 
locations while technology followers are likely to position themselves to profit from locating 
in areas where spillovers are prevalent. Agglomerations thus mainly attract technology 
followers that hope to benefit from spillovers while technology leaders are more likely to 
pursue specialised scientific assets.  
3. Leaders, followers and the paradox of openness revisited 
The trade-off between openness and appropriation is contingent upon the type of firm. 
Specifically, the association between patenting and openness will be stronger when the focal 
firm invests heavily in research and development, and relies upon product innovation, 
because such a firm is more vulnerable to spillovers during collaboration. Such firms will 
have proprietary technical information which distinguishes them from rivals. Their profits are 
also more sensitive to the entry of imitators, which erode innovation rents. These firms, 
whom we call leaders, are more likely to benefit from patents if they are open, as compared 
to followers, who have less to gain from patenting, and potentially more to gain from 
successfully collaborating. Followers have less proprietary technical information. They also 
typically have less to fear that their spillovers will facilitate the entry of other competitors. As 
a result, their benefits from patenting should be less closely related to whether they are open 
or not, as compared to leaders. 
To express this intuition more precisely, we develop a framework which makes 
explicit the costs and benefits of both openness and patenting and recognises that firms make 
decisions on patenting and openness at the same time. Let V be the value from the innovation 
without collaboration and (V +x+y) be the value with collaboration. We assume x > 0 which 
is the same as assuming collaboration creates value. When there is a potential for spillovers, 
the value with collaboration will include an additional term, y, which y represents leakage of 
knowledge. We assume that spillovers reduce value i.e., y < 0. Thus x+y represents the net 
incremental profit from collaborating during innovation.  
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Patenting offers firms an opportunity to reduce leakage losses during collaboration 
and, independent of collaboration, potentially also increases the value of the innovation by 
preventing imitation. For a closed firm, let Vp be the payoff from innovation with a patent, 
and V'= Vp – V represent the change in value if firm patents. Similarly, for an open firm, the 
payoff it patents is Vp + xp + yp, where xp represents the benefit of collaboration with a 
patent, and yp represents the loss of value due to leakage of information protected by a patent. 
Thus x'= xp – x represents how the incremental value from collaboration changes if the firm 
patents. Similarly y' = yp – y represents the reduction in value loss due to leakage of valuable 
information, either about the focal innovation or background knowledge. 
Note that V' represents the “traditional” motive for patenting, namely to protect the 
focal innovation. Not all innovations can be patented. Moreover, an innovation may not be 
worth patenting, once the direct costs of obtaining a patent and the indirect costs, in the form 
of disclosure, are taken into account. Therefore, V' can be either positive or negative. 
One can interpret x' as representing the potential inefficiency in collaboration when 
the partners are trying to collaborate but one is focused on patenting. Organisational-
openness theory implies x' < 0 because patenting reduces the value from collaboration. 
Finally, y' represents the potential benefit from patenting to guard against spillovers during 
collaboration, and the spillover-prevention theory implies y' > 0. The sum, x'+ y' represents 
the difference in the incremental payoff to patenting between open and closed firms.  
Since patenting and openness are not randomly assigned to firms but jointly 
determined, moving from theoretical trade-offs to observed combinations of choices depends 
not only on the payoff to that choice but also the payoffs of all other choices. Using the 
notation developed above, we can specify four combinations, along with the associated 
payoffs – (i) collaborate and patent (Vp + xp + yp); (ii) collaborate and not patent (V+x+y); 
(iii) not collaborate and patent (Vp); and not collaborate and not patent (V). If we assume that 
the payoff from each choice has an additive error term that is iid and distributed with a 
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Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution, the probability of the different combination 
of choices can be written as follows8 
Pr(no collaborate & no patent) = exp(V)/D     (1) 
Pr(no collaborate & patent) = exp(Vp)/D     (2) 
Pr(collaborate & no patent) = exp(V+ x+y)/D    (3) 
Pr(collaborate & patent) = exp(Vp+ xp + yp)/D    (4) 
Where D = exp(V) + exp(Vp) + exp(V+ x+y) + exp(Vp + xp + yp) 
Notice that the joint probability given in (4) is related to but different from the 
probability of collaboration given patenting— the focus of much of the empirical literature. 
In fact there are four conditional probabilities we could derive and they are given by: 
Pr(collaboration |patent) = exp(Vp+ xp + yp  Vp) /(1+ exp(Vp + xp + yp V)) 
= exp(xp + yp)/(1+ exp(xp + yp))    (5) 
Pr(no collaboration | patent) = 1/(1+ exp(xp + yp))    (5') 
Pr(patent | collaboration) = exp(Vp+ xp + yp V xy)/(1+ exp(Vp + xp + yp V 
xy)) = exp(V'+x'+ y')/(1+ exp(V'+x'+ y'))                  (6) 
Pr(patent | no collaboration) = exp(V')/(1+ exp(V'))               (6') 
Some of the literature (e.g. Laursen and Salter, 2014) has effectively compared (5) 
with (5').9 Zobel et al. (2013) by contrast find that the conditional mean of patenting is higher 
for open than closed firms. They thus compare (6) and (6').  
                                                            
8 For instance, the payoff with no collaboration and no patenting is V+ 1, where  is distributed with GEV type 
I distribution, and the other payoffs are analogously defined. These are the assumptions underlying the familiar 
multinomial logit model. Though we do show the joint probabilities using simple contingency tables, separately 
for leaders and followers, we do not estimate a multinomial logit because it would imply estimating a set of 
parameters for each of the choices. With limited number of observations, we chose to directly estimate the 
expectation of patenting conditional upon openness for leaders and followers. 
9 We treat collaboration (or openness) as well as patent as binary. For binary variables, the conditional mean is 
the same as the conditional probability, so that, for instance, Pr(Collaboration |patent) = E(collaborate | patent) 
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Our framework allows us to infer something about the underlying benefits and costs 
of patenting and collaboration by observing the patenting and collaboration choices made by 
the firm. For instance, if one finds that patenting firms collaborate more than non-patenting 
firms, this lets us infer that the sum xp + yp >0. However, one might find that xp + yp >0 and 
xp + yp< x + y can be both true, so that patenting actually reduces the benefit of collaboration 
compared to non-patenting. Again drawing on our framework above, we can see that 
E(Patenting| open)E(Patenting| closed) is positive if and only if x'+ y' is positive. Therefore, 
a positive association between patenting and openness lets us infer that spillover-prevention 
dominates organisational-openness.  
Thus far, however, we have treated all firms as homogeneous. If firms differ, as we 
argue they do, the average relationship may conceal significant differences, which are both of 
practical and theoretical significance. To see this we develop the framework further and use 
the subscripts L and F to denote leaders and followers respectively. As noted right at the 
beginning of this section we expect spillover prevention will dominate organisational 
openness for leaders because leaders have more to fear from imitation and knowledge 
spillovers. This is equivalent to x'L +y'L > 0. In this situation we expect to find leaders 
patenting more than followers. Thus, if we observe E(Patent | open)L > E(Patent |closed)L 
then we can infer that spillover prevention dominates organisational openness for leaders, 
or, x'L +y'L > 0 (Proposition 1a).10 
Similarly, if x'F +y'F < 0, then we could expect that organisational openness dominates 
spillover prevention for followers. Followers have less proprietary technical information. As 
followers, they also typically have less to fear that their spillovers will facilitate the entry of 
other competitors. Thus, firms that are open and seek to benefit from collaboration would 
also patent less. Thus, if we observe that E(Patent | open)F < E(Patent |closed)F, we can infer 
that organisational openness dominates spillover prevention for followers, i.e., x'F +y'F < 0 
(Proposition 1b). 
Comparing patenting by closed leaders and followers reveals the relative value of 
patenting for leaders and followers. If E(Patent | closed)L > E(Patent |closed)F we can infer 
                                                            
10 Proofs of this and other statements are provided in the appendix. 
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that leaders value patents more than followers even absent collaboration, i.e., VL' > VF' 
(Proposition 2a). Comparing patenting by open leaders and followers will reveal if open 
leaders gain more from patenting than open followers. That is, if E(Patent | open)L > 
E(Patent |open)F then we infer that leaders value patents more when collaborating compared 
to followers, i.e., (VL'+x'L+y'L) (VF'+ x'F +y'F) >0 (Proposition 2b). 
In our empirical analysis, we also test the more compact hypothesis E(Patent | open)L 
 E(Patent |closed)L > E(Patent | open)F  E(Patent |closed)F. This hypothesis, we believe, is 
the closest to intuitive argument that leaders are more susceptible to spillovers during 
collaboration than are followers. E(Patent | open)L  E(Patent |closed)L represents the 
increase in patenting by leaders when they are open compared to when they are closed. 
E(Patent | open)F  E(Patent |closed)F represents the corresponding change for followers. Put 
differently, the difference in patenting between open and closed firms will be larger among 
the group of firms classified as leaders when compared to the difference in patenting between 
open and closed firms among followers. In statistical language we look for “differences in 
differences”. 
 
4. Data, Methods and Variables 
4.1. Data 
We use the Survey of Innovation and Patent Use (SIPU) commissioned by the UK 
Intellectual Property Office in September 2012 and administered by the telephone survey 
team of the Office of National Statistics to test our conjectures. The survey is based on a 
sampling frame drawn from the sixth wave of Community Innovation Survey (CIS 6) 
conducted in 2006-2008 and asked questions about firms’ innovation and technology in-
licensing activities over 2009-2012. The advantage of this sampling frame is that it gave us 
information on the antecedent technological behaviour of the surveyed firms. 
The sample eligible for SIPU comprised of firms that agreed to be contacted again 
when they took part in the 2009 UK CIS (the CIS 6). In all 1,365 firms were contacted and 
the survey achieved 801 completed interviews and 10 partial interviews, yielding a response 
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rate of 60.1%. 464 firms could not be contacted and 74 refused to participate in the survey. 
The SIPU sample yielded information on 329 innovating firms.  
4.2 Identifying open and closed firms  
We classify the 329 innovative firms into open and closed innovative firms. The 
openness is defined according to the number of different types of the firms' external 
collaborators. 11 In the CIS 6, firms are asked whether they cooperated in innovative activities 
with six types of organisations: suppliers of equipment, materials, services or software; 
clients or customers; competitors or other businesses in their industry; consultants, 
commercial labs, or private R&D institutes; universities or other higher education institutions; 
and government or public institutes. If a firm collaborated with two or more types of external 
partners on innovation (the median number of collaborators is two), it is classified as an open 
innovative firm. Otherwise, it is considered as a closed innovative firm. This method resulted 
in approximately equal numbers of open and closed firms- there were 163 open and 166 
closed firms. 
4.3  Identifying technology leaders and followers 
We use a k-means cluster analysis to classify firms as technology leaders or 
technology followers. 12  The clustering was based on two variables, viz. R&D intensity 
(measured the logarithm of internal R&D expenditure divided by number of employees) and 
the value of innovations (measured by the percentage of revenue from product innovation). 
Unlike openness, where we have roughly equal numbers of open and closed firms, the cluster 
analysis sensibly yields more followers than leaders. We expect technology leaders to show 
(on average) higher R&D intensity and more valuable innovations than firms in the 
                                                            
11 Of these 329 firms, 81 firms had not reported an innovation in CIS 6 but 18 of those 81 had reported ongoing 
innovation and so were asked questions about collaboration. Only 1 firm of the 18 that had answered the 
question on collaboration had reported collaborating with a large number of partners. Hence we treated all the 
63 firms as being closed. Excluding these 63 firms from the sample altogether yields qualitatively similar 
results.  
12 The cluster procedure begins with two initial group centres. Observations are assigned to the group with the 
closest centre. The mean of the observations assigned to each of the groups is computed, and the process is 
repeated. These steps continue until all observations remain in the same group from the previous iteration (Stata, 
2015). 
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technology follower group. This is indeed what we find in Table 1. Based on the leadership 
and openness measures, we group the firms into four categories: open leader, closed leader, 
open follower and closed follower (Table 2).  
 
(Here insert Table 1) 
 
(Here insert Table 2) 
 
4.4  Patenting 
We follow Arora et al. (2014) by measuring whether the firm had applied for a patent 
for their most significant innovation. Respondents were asked, “Of all the new or 
significantly improved goods or services or processes you brought to market since November 
2009, think of the one that accounts for the most turnover”- thus, the most significant 
innovation is their most valuable one. Then they were asked if they applied for a patent for 
this innovation. Around 1/6th of the innovative firms had patented their most significant 
innovation (see the mean of “Innovator applied for a patent for significant innovation”, Table 
3). 13,14 
 
(Here insert Table 3) 
We verified the robustness of our results using a second measure of patent propensity 
viz. the share of innovations patented. We follow Arundel and Kabla (1998) and Cohen et al. 
(2000) in the SIPU survey to ask firms what percentage of their innovations was associated 
                                                            
13 Most of the extant literature uses a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has patented or not as an 
indicator of patent use. This measure of patent use does not allow us to control for the scale of innovations—
larger firms will have more innovations and so will more often patent more. Moreover, firms with multiple 
innovations are more likely to file at least one patent than a firm, with the same patent propensity, which has 
few innovations because of a smaller scale.  
14 If an innovator applied for a patent for significant innovation, the value of the dependent variable is 100, 
otherwise 0. This treatment puts the coefficients of the regression (presented in Table 5a) in a similar range as 
that of the conditional mean in percentage (presented in Table 4d). 
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with patent applications. In response, firms were asked to select one of six bands for the 
innovations viz. less than 10%, 10-40%, 41-60%, 61-90%, over 90%. We assume that the 
percentage in each band is concentrated around the midpoint. Among all respondents, the 
mean share of innovations patented is around 5%. For patenting firms only, the mean share of 
innovations patented is about 26%.  
Both measures yield very similar results. We only feature the results for whether the 
firm had patented its most significant innovation because typically firms have only a few 
innovations. The featured measure minimises measurement error.15 As well, we can control 
for whether the innovation is a product innovation or not. Doing so is important because 
process innovations are typically less likely to be patented.  
4.4 Control variables 
To control for the influence of the codifiability of firms' knowledge on the patentability 
of their innovations, we follow Brusoni et al., (2005) and create a variable codification of 
knowledge based on the perceived importance of information from scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications and importance of information from technical, industry or service 
standards to firms’ innovation related activities, which are recorded in the CIS 6. The CIS6 
asks firms to rank from 0-3 the importance of information received from various sources to a 
firm’s innovation activities, where 0 indicates that the source is not used and 3 indicates that 
it is very important. The value of codification of knowledge is the highest value that a firm 
gave to these two sources.  
We use the logarithmic employment as a measurement of a firm’s size. In the 
regression with the dependent variable of whether the company applied for a patent for 
significant innovation, we add a control variable turnover from significant innovation to 
control for the importance of the significant innovation to the firm. In the SIPU, firms were 
asked to indicate what percentage of total turnover was from the significant innovation, such 
as 1-5%, 6-10%, 11-25%, 26-50% and more than 50%. We take the midpoint in each band as 
the value for the control variable. We also add a dummy variable significant innovation is a 
                                                            
15 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. 
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new good to control for the higher probability that a new good would be patented in 
comparison to the probability that a new service or process would be patented.  
To control for industry characteristics, we generated 17 dummy variables at the two-
digit industry level. A dummy variable is assigned to a two-digit industry as long as there are 
greater than 8 observations from this industry. Our results are unchanged if we use other 
industry controls, such as classifying industries into high, medium, and low technology 
intensity groups. The summary statistics and correlation matrix of the variables are presented 
in Table 3. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
We begin by showing the joint distribution between openness and patenting, specifically the 
four probabilities given by expressions (1) to (4). The data indicate a modest positive 
relationship between openness and patenting. This positive relationship is much stronger for 
leaders, but reversed for followers. We follow up on this analysis with a more traditional 
regression analysis where we estimate the expected value of patenting conditional upon 
whether the firm is a leader or not, and whether it is open or not, controlling for various firm 
characteristics. We prefer this approach to the more obvious multinomial logit because it 
links our paper more closely to the existing literature, and makes it easy to see how the 
increase in patenting between open and closed firms varies between leaders and followers. A 
multinomial logit also requires estimating three times as many parameters, greatly reducing 
the statistical power of tests of differences.16 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
We begin with a simple descriptive analysis where we divide firms into whether they 
patent their most significant innovation (henceforth, patent) and whether they are open. Table 
4a shows the result for the sample as a whole. The numbers in each cell are the counts of the 
firms in each category, and their share in the total sample. These correspond to the joint 
probabilities of openness and patenting. Note that there is a modest positive association 
                                                            
16 The multinomial logit estimates yield qualitatively similar results. 
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between openness and patenting. For instance, overall about 16% of innovators patent, 
whereas over 22.5% of open innovators patent. 
To relate this to the model developed in section 3, we note that [Pr(open & 
patent)Pr(open & no patent)] [Pr(closed & patent)  Pr(closed & no patent)]= = [9.15%- 
40.55%] [ 6.71% 43.60%] = 5.49% consistent with the notion that overall patenting and 
openness are positively associated. 
 (Here insert Table 4a) 
(Here insert Table 4b) 
(Here insert Table 4c) 
(Here insert Table 4d) 
Tables 4b and 4c show the same results separately for technology leaders and 
followers respectively. In Table 4b we see clearly that the positive association between 
patenting and collaboration is much stronger than average in the case of technology leaders. 
Table 4c shows virtually no relationship between patenting and openness for followers. In 
other words, these simple descriptive findings suggest that for leaders, spillover prevention 
dominates organisational openness, whereas the two forces appear to largely balance each 
other for followers. 
Table 4d summarises this point by showing the conditional probabilities, which much 
of the literature has implicitly focused on. The difference in patenting between open and 
closed firms varies between leaders and followers. We see that E(patent |open leader) is 
nearly 26% while E(patent |closed leader) is less than 12%; Open leaders are twice as likely 
to patent as close leaders. Instead, E(patent | open follower) is 13% whereas E(patent | closed 
follower) is 14%; open followers are slightly less likely to patent than close followers, 
although the difference is not statistically significant.  
These patterns are consistent with our theoretical argument that leaders are more 
vulnerable to spillovers. Thus, when leaders collaborate in innovation they are more likely to 
use patents than when they innovate internally, and this difference is large and statistically 
significant. However, when followers collaborate in innovation, they are not more likely to 
patent than when they innovate internally.  
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5.2: Regression Analysis 
The simple differences in conditional means do not control for a variety of other 
factors, such as scale and industry characteristics. Accordingly, we estimate the expectation 
of whether the firm patents its most significant innovation conditional on the firm type (e.g., 
open leader, closed leader, open follower, closed follower), as well as a variety of firm 
characteristics and industry dummies. The most straightforward way of doing so is through a 
linear regression specification; the estimated regression coefficients are the conditional means 
we theorise about. Probits or logits yield very similar results. 
Since we are using the coefficients of the regression equation on the four groups 
(open leader, closed leader, open follower and closed follower) as a measure of conditional 
mean of patenting, the statistical significance of the coefficient is less important for our 
analysis than the difference in coefficient values across the groups. Thus, we report in Table 
5b the results on a number of F-tests which tests the equivalence of the conditional mean for 
patenting. Each column of Table 5b corresponds to a column of reported coefficients in Table 
5a. We also examine whether the difference in patenting between open and closed leaders is 
greater than the corresponding difference in patenting among followers. Formally, we test 
that the “difference in difference” is positive and significant and the two-tailed test of this 
hypothesis is reported in the last row of Table 5b. 
(Here insert Tables 5a & 5b) 
Tables 5a and 5b show that the patterns shown in Table 4a, 4b and 4c hold even after 
controlling for firm and technology characteristics, and industry fixed effects. In the first 
column of Table 5a, we regress the four choices of firms against the use of patents to protect 
their most significant innovation and do not include any industry dummies or firm controls. 
Column 1 in Table 5 thus reproduces the specification implied by Table 4d. We see that 
E(patent |open)LE(patent |closed)L =25.71 11.67= 14.05, which is both large and 
statistically significant, as shown in the first row of Table 5b. Following our discussion in 
Section 3, we infer that x'L +y'L > 0 (proposition 1a). 
Similarly, we find that E(patent |open)L  E(patent |open)F =12.8, also large and 
statistically significant. Inclusion of additional controls does not change this result very much 
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(see second row of Table 5b). Following the discussion in Section 3 (proposition 2b), we infer 
that (VL'+ x'L +y'L) (VF'+ x'F +y'F) >0. However, we also find that E(patent |closed)L  
E(patent |closed)F is -2.62, but statistically insignificant. As formally demonstrated in 
proposition 2a, this implies that VL'=VF'. As well, E(patent |open) F  E(patent |closed)F is 
slightly negative, but statistically insignificant, at 1.38. According to proposition 1b, this 
implies x'F +y'F =0.  
Consistent with these findings, the change in patenting for followers that collaborate 
compared to followers that do not collaborate is significantly smaller than for leaders, i.e., 
{E(patent | open)LE(patent |closed)L}  {E(patent |open)F E(patent |closed)F} = 15%, 
which is both large (recall that mean patenting rate is only slightly larger than 15%) and 
statistically significant, as can be seen in the last row of Table 5b. 
Column 2 shows that including 17 industry fixed effects has only a slight effect on the 
differences in the conditional means. The difference in patenting rates between open and 
closed leaders decreases from about 14% to about 11% once industry effects are included. 
However, the difference in patenting rates between open and closed followers becomes more 
negative (increases in absolute value), from 1.4% to about 4.7%. As a result, the 
“difference in difference” also increases slightly from 15.4% to 16.0%. This difference in 
difference is statistically significant and quantitatively large, equal to the mean rate of 
patenting in the sample as a whole.  
Columns 3 and 4 progressively add controls for firm size, codification of knowledge 
and percentage of turnover from significant innovation. Although the differences in 
conditional means remain more stable, the precision of the estimates falls as standard errors 
increase. For instance, in Column 3, the differences in patenting rates between open and 
closed leaders is about 11.4%, whereas the difference between open and closed followers is 
nearly 5.3%. The difference in difference actually increases to 16.6% (compared to 16.0% 
with only industry effects). Column 5 additionally controls for whether the significant 
innovation is a good, rather than a service or process. In this specification, the difference in 
patenting rates between open and closed leaders is about 8.4%, but the difference between 
open and closed followers is -7.0%. The difference in difference is 15.4%, which is 
statistically significant as well. 
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In sum, we find that open leaders patent more than closed leaders, and that open 
leaders patent more than open followers. However, closed leaders patent at similar rates as 
closed followers and open followers. It follows that the association between openness and 
patenting is positive and significant for leaders, and is significantly larger than the association 
between openness and patenting for followers. From this, using our framework we infer that 
for UK CIS6 firms x'L +y'L is positive and x'F +y'F = 0. These relationships imply that leaders 
are vulnerable to spillovers while collaborating and this concern outweighs any potential 
benefits from attracting collaborators and enhancing the efficiency of collaboration. By 
contrast, for followers any concerns about spillovers of background knowledge appear to be 
balanced by benefits from openness in terms of enhancing the efficiency of collaboration. 
Interestingly, we also find that VL' = VF' which suggests that both leaders and followers have 
similar valuations for the traditional benefits of patents. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has revisited the “paradox of openness”, which describes a trade-off when 
firms open up to outsiders to generate knowledge may weaken the firm’s power to capture 
knowledge. Associated with this paradox, there are two opposing theoretical hypotheses. On 
the one hand, firms are more likely to seek external collaborators if they can protect their 
innovation by patents, and more generally, can guard against unintended knowledge 
spillovers to partners. We call it the “spillover prevention” theory. In this view, we expect to 
see a positive correlation between patenting and openness. On the other hand, patenting and 
exclusivity makes a firm less efficient in developing collaborative innovations, and hence 
also, a less attractive partner. We dub this the “organisational openness” theory. It implies a 
negative relationship between patenting and openness. 
In this paper we start from the premise that both patenting and openness are jointly 
determined, and therefore, one cannot use a causal inference approach, common in this 
literature. We therefore develop a simple empirical framework that incorporates the joint 
determination of both variables. We argue that the relationship between patenting and 
openness is contingent on the technological and innovation leadership of firms. Firms will 
make different choices about being open and about patenting depending upon whether they 
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are technically superior to their rivals. We use our framework to derive the empirical 
implications of this contingency for the relationship between patenting and openness. We test 
this empirically, using a novel survey of a sample of over 325 innovative firms that were also 
covered in the sixth wave of the UK Community Innovation Survey. 
We conclude that the trade-off between openness and patenting is resolved differently 
by different types of firms. Leading firms are more vulnerable to unintended knowledge 
spillovers during collaboration as compared to followers, and consequently, we find that the 
increase in patenting due to openness is higher for leaders than for followers. Followers, with 
incremental innovations that benefit less from patenting and with little proprietary technology 
and knowhow, may be less willing to patent because it makes them a less attractive open 
partner and perhaps also less able to derive value from collaboration.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Leader and Follower Firms 
  R&D intensity % of revenue from product innovation 
Leader Minimum 0 18 
 Mean 1.03 32.39 
 Maximum 4.17 75 
Follower Minimum 0 0 
 Mean .38 3.03 
 Maximum 4.41 8 
Total Minimum 0 0 
 Mean .64 14.62 
 Maximum 4.41 75 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Number of Firms in Four Categories by Leadership and Openness 
 Leader Follower Total 
Open 70 93 163 
Closed 61 105 166 
Total 131 198 329 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Variables Number of Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 
Innovator applied for a 
patent for significant 
innovation 
328 15.85 36.58 0.00 100.00 1.00                 
2 Open leader 329 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.15 1.00         
3 Closed leader 329 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 -0.05 -0.25 1.00        
4 Open follower 329 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 -0.05 -0.33 -0.31 1.00       
5 Closed follower 329 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 -0.05 -0.35 -0.32 -0.42 1.00      
6 Log employment 329 4.01 1.40 1.39 9.83 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 0.10 -0.06 1.00     
7 Codification of Knowledge 329 1.31 1.07 0.00 3.00 0.10 0.22 -0.11 0.25 -0.35 0.09 1.00    
8 Turnover from Significant Innovation 316 0.14 0.20 0.00 0.75 -0.01 0.29 0.07 -0.17 -0.15 -0.07 0.04 1.00   
9 Significant innovation is a new good 329 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.26 0.00 -0.09 -0.14 -0.03 0.06 -0.07 1.00 
 
 
30 
 
Table 4a: Openness and patenting of focal innovation: All firms 
 Patent Not Patent Total 
Open 30 133 163 
 9.15% 40.55% 49.7%
Closed 22 143 165 
 6.71% 43.6% 50.3%
Total 52 276 328 
 15.85% 84.15% 100% 
 
Table 4b: Openness and patenting of focal innovation: Leaders  
 Patent Not Patent Total 
Open 18 52 70 
 13.85% 40% 53.85%
Closed 7 53 60 
 5.38% 40.77% 46.15%
Total 25 105 130 
 19.23% 80.77% 100% 
 
Table 4c: Openness and patenting of focal innovation: Followers 
 Patent Not Patent Total 
Open 12 81 93 
 6.06% 40.91% 46.97%
Closed 15 90 105 
 7.58% 45.45% 53.03%
Total 27 171 198 
 13.64% 86.36% 100% 
 
Table 4d: Percentage of Firms Patenting Focal Innovation 
 Leader Follower Leader minus Follower 
Open 25.71 12.90 12.81** 
 (5.26) (3.50) (6.09) 
Closed 11.67 14.29 -2.62 
 (4.18) (3.43) (5.53) 
Open minus Closed 14.05** -1.38  
 (6.88) (4.91)  
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *** denotes a significance level of 1%, 
** denotes a significance level of 5%, * denotes a significance level of 10%. 
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Table 5a: OLS Regression. Dependent Variable: Innovator Applied for a Patent for 
Significant Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Open Leader  25.71 22.01 13.54 12.64 2.66 
(5.26) (8.10) (9.94) (10.70) (11.29) 
Closed Leader 11.67 10.75 2.19 2.05 -5.73 
(4.17) (6.98) (9.52) (9.99) (9.97) 
Open Follower  12.90 10.08 1.41 -0.80 -7.26 
(3.50) (7.04) (8.88) (9.75) (10.15) 
Closed Follower 14.29 14.78 6.69 6.14 -0.26 
 (6.59) (9.01) (9.69) (9.69) 
Log Employment    2.20 2.29 2.54 
  (1.67) (1.73) (1.70) 
Codification of 
Knowledge    2.00 2.10 
   (2.27) (2.23) 
Turnover from 
Significant Innovation    -3.85 -0.28 
   (10.92) (10.82) 
Significant innovation 
is a new good     10.33 
     (4.14) 
17 Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 328 328 328 316 316 
R2 0.18 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 
F-statistic 15.66*** 3.28*** 3.19*** 2.90*** 2.85*** 
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Table 5b: F Statistics for difference in estimated coefficients.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
H0: coefficient of open 
leader = coefficient of closed 
leader 
4.38** 2.89* 2.95* 2.27 1.37 
H0: coefficient of open 
leader = coefficient of open 
follower 
4.12** 3.55* 3.74** 4.12** 2.16 
H0: coefficient of closed 
leader = coefficient of closed 
follower 
0.23 0.55 0.67 0.54 1.02 
H0: coefficient of open 
follower = coefficient of 
closed follower 
0.08 0.91 1.20 1.66 1.75 
H0: coefficient of open 
leader – coefficient of closed 
leader = coefficient of open 
follower – coefficient of 
closed follower 
3.45* 3.95** 4.34** 4.52** 3.47* 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. These tests have been 
performed on the regression coefficients reported in corresponding columns of Table 5a. 
*** denotes a significance level of 1%, ** denotes a significance level of 5%, * denotes a 
significance level of 10% 
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Appendix 
 
The following relationships are useful, and have been derived in the text. 
Pr(Patent |open)L = exp(VL' + x'L +y'L)/(1+ exp(VL' + x'L +y'L)) 
Pr(Patent |closed)L= exp(VL')/(1+ exp(VL')) 
Pr(Patent |open)F = exp(VF' + x'F +y'F)/(1+ exp(VF' + x'F +y'F)) 
Pr(Patent |closed)F = exp(VF')/(1+ exp(VF')) 
 
Proposition: (1a) E(Patent |open)L > E(Patent |closed)L iff x'L +y'L > 0 
Proposition: (1b) E(Patent | open)F < E(Patent |closed)F iff x'F +y'F < 0 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
E(Patent |open)L  E(Patent |closed) = Pr(Patent |open)L  Pr(Patent |closed)L 
= {exp(VL' + x'L +y'L)  exp(VL')}/{(1+ exp(VF' + x'F +y'F) (1+ exp(VL')} 
={exp(VL')(exp(x'L +y'L) 1)}/{(1+ exp(VF' + x'F +y'F) (1+ exp(VL')} 
> 0 iff exp(x'L +y'L)  > 1 iff x'L +y'L >0 
The proof of 1b follows similarly. 
 
Proposition 2a: E(Patent |closed)L > E(Patent |closed)F iff VL' > VF', and 
Proposition 2b: E(Patent | open)L > E(Patent |open)F iff VL' + x'L +y'L > VF' + x'F +y'F 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
E(Patent |closed)L  E(Patent |closed)F = Pr(Patent |closed)L  Pr(Patent |closed)F 
= exp(VL')/(1+ exp(VL'))  exp(VF')/(1+ exp(VF')) 
= {exp(VL')  exp(VF') }/{(1+ exp(VL) (1+ exp(VF')} 
> 0 iff VL' > VF' 
E(Patent |open)L  E(Patent |open)F =Pr(Patent |open)L  Pr(Patent |open)F  
= exp(VL' + x'L +y'L)/(1+ exp(VL' + x'L +y'L))  exp(VF' + x'F +y'F)/(1+ exp(VF' + x'F +y'F)) 
= {exp(VL'+ x'L +y'L)  exp(VF'+ x'F +y'F) }/{(1+ exp(VL' + x'L +y'L)) (1+ exp(VF' + x'F 
+y'F))}  
> 0 iff VL' + x'L +y'L > VF' + x'F +y'F 
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